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EDITOR'S NOTE

REFERRING TO FOREIGN LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: AN EPISODE IN THE CULTURE
WARS
Mark Tushnet is the Cannack Waterhouse Professor of
Constitutional Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. He
received his undergraduate degree magna cum laude from Harvard
College in 1967. He received a J.D. and M.A. in history from Yale
University in 1971. He clerked for Judge George Edwards and
Justice Thurgood Marshall before beginning to teach at the
University of Wisconsin Law School in 1973. In 1981 he moved
to the Georgetown University Law Center. He has been a visiting
professor at the University of Texas, University of Southern
California, University of Chicago, Columbia University, New
York University, and Harvard law schools.
Professor Tushnet is the co-author of four casebooks, including
the most widely used casebook on constitutional law,
Constitutional Law (with Stone, Seidman, and Sunstein). He has
written fourteen books, including a two-volume work on the life of
Justice Thurgood Marshall and A Court Divided: The Rehnquist
Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, and edited eight
others.
He has received fellowships from the Rockefeller
Humanities Program, the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial
Foundation, and has written numerous articles on constitutional
law and legal history. He was President of the Association of
American Law Schools in 2003. In 2002 he was elected a fellow
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Professor Tushnet presented a version of this speech at the
University of Baltimore School of Law Center for International
and Comparative Law's Annual Lecture on International and
Comparative Law. His remarks offer a perspective on the
interpretation of foreign law in the U.S. Supreme Court and
address the speech given by The Honorable Peter J. Messitte,
which can be found at 35 U. BALT. L. REv 171 (2005).

REFERRING TO FOREIGN LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: AN EPISODE IN THE CULTURE
WARS
Mark Tushnett

As Judge Messitte's essay demonstrates, I recent references in
Supreme Court decisions to non-U.S. legal materials have
generated a great deal of controversy. Those who make such
references say that doing so is no big dea1. 2 I have called the
controversy a tempest in a teapot. 3 My topic here is the disjuncture
between the perception on one side that something important and
troubling has happened--or, as I will argue, may be about to
happen-and the perception on the other that there is nothing to be
concerned about. After describing in Section I the practice that has
given rise to the controversy, I examine in Section II one feature of
the controversy that, I believe, has not yet been addressed in detail:
The target of criticism is not really what Justices of the Supreme
Court have done, but rather what they might do. I then argue that
the fact that the target is an imagined practice rather than the real
one is a clue to the nature of the controversy. The controversy, I
conclude in Section III, is a skirmish in the ongoing culture wars
over the courts. The claims made against and for references to
non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation ought to be analyzed
as cultural artifacts rather than as arguments, that is, in terms of the
reasons given against and for the practice.

t

I.

2.

3.

Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. I thank Mortimer Sellers for inviting me to give the lecture on
which this Essay is loosely based, Eric Posner for suggesting the lines of
argument I pursue here, and Martin Lederman for helpful comments. This Essay
is a companion to Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing
More?: Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S.
Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006), where some of the ideas touched on here are
developed in more detail, and which touches on this Essay's primary topic.
See Peter J. Messitte, Citing Foreign Law In
u.s. Courts:
Is Our Sovereignty Really At Stake?, 35 U. BALT. L. REv 171 (2005).
Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'y REv., JuneJuly 2005, at 4, available at http://www.policyreview.orgljun05/anderson.html
(attributing phrasc to Justice Stephen Breyer).
Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
239,248 (2003).
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THE SUPREME COURT'S PRACTICE DESCRIBED

Probably the most striking thing about the controversy is the
large gap between what the Supreme Court has actually donerather little, as I will show-and the rather high level of concern
and even outrage the Court's critics have expressed. The practice
the critics focus on consists of somewhere between four and seven
references to non-U.S. law, in a body of constitutional adjudication
that runs thousands of pages. A simple enumeration of the
references should be enough to motivate the remainder of my
argument. The references fall into two categories: those by the
Court, and those by individual Justices. I begin with the references
to non-U.S. law in majority opinions.
A.

Atkins v. Virginia

A footnote in Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion for the Court
in Atkins v. Virginia, holding unconstitutional the practice of
executing criminal defendants with mental retardation, stated:
"Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders
is overwhelmingly disapproved.,,4 This factual assertion followed
references to purely domestic sources: the positions taken by U.S.
"organizations with germane expertise" and by "representatives of
widely diverse religious communities in the United States."s
These materials were cited to support the proposition that decisions
by U.S. legislatures "reflect[ed] a much broader social and
professional consensus.,,6 After criticizing the majority's analysis
of entirely domestic sources of law, Justice Scalia characterized the
reference to the fact of disapproval within the world community as
"the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus.",7
He did not dispute the factual claim the Court made. 8
B.

Lawrence v. Texas

Lawrence referred to non-U.S. law for two purposes. The
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick had said that the claim
that there was a deeply rooted tradition protecting people's right to
engage in consensual homosexual activity was "at best,
facetious.,,9 Chief Justice Warren Burger's concurring opinion in
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing Brief for The European
Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, McCarver v. North Carolina,
533 U.S. 955 (2001) (No. 00-8727».
/d.

Id.
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
/d. at 347-48.
478 U.S. 186,194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Bowers asserted that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention
throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and
ethical standards. ,,10

In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Anthony Kennedy supported his
claim that both assertions were overstated by referring to
developments in u.s. law over the prior fifty years, to legislative
developments in Great Britain, and to a 1981 decision by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) finding anti-sodomy
laws to violate the European Convention on Human Rights. II That
decision, Justice Kennedy wrote, showed the error in "the premise
in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our
Western civilization.,,12 The decision by the European Court
showed, first, that Chief Justice Burger's assertions were too
"sweeping," I 3 and, second, that the majority's conclusion in
Bowers that "the claim . . . was insubstantial in our Western
civilization" was erroneous. 14 The references to non-U.S. law
were used to refute assertions in Bowers about the existence of
consensus or substantial unanimity in the Western tradition-that
is, essentially as evidence of facts about opinions in Western
societies. 15 In this they resemble the reference in Atkins.
C.

Roper v. Simmons

The decision invalidating the imposition of capital punishment
on juvenile offenders contained the Court's most extensive
discussion of non-U.S. law. 16 Earlier references amounted to no
more than a few sentences in a Court opinion; Roper had an entire
section devoted to non-U.S. law. 17 The Roper opinion had three
sections of substantive analysis. 18 The first examined domestic
law, and concluded that there was a trend in that law against the

10.

/d. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

11.

539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003).
Jd. at 573.
Jd. at 572.
Jd. at 573. The Bowers majority opinion did not specifically say that the claim
there asserted was "facetious" in light of the history of Western civilization, but
its reference to tradition makes Justice Kennedy's restatement at least a plausible
one.
For this reason, Ernest A. Young, author of Foreign Law and the Denominator
Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 153 (2005), is mistaken in suggesting that the
Court engaged in "sloppy opinion writing" in referring to the European Court's
decision "merely . . . [as a]fact" rather than for the reasons it contained. The
very point was to note the decision as a fact.
Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Jd. at 574-78.
ld. at 563-78.

12.
13.

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.
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imposItIOn of capital punishment on juvenile offenders. 19 The
second contained the majority's own evaluation of the propriety of
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders, in light of
principles of deterrence, retribution, and criminal responsibility, an
evaluation the Court asserted was required by precedent. 20 The
third contained the references to non-U.S. law. 21 It began by
asserting that the conclusions already reached in the prior sections
"find[] confirmation" in practices elsewhere in the world. 22 Those
practices, the opinion noted, were not "controlling.,,23 The final
words of the five paragraphs devoted to non-U.S. law reiterated
these points: "The opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions.,,24
Now for the references in separate opinions by individual
Justices.
D.

Printz v. United States

The first significant reference to non-U.S. law in modem
constitutional adjudication came in Justice Breyer's dissenting
opmIOn in Printz v. United States. 25 Against the majority's
holding, as he interpreted the decision, that important values of
federalism were better promoted by barring the national
government from requiring state and local executive officials to
devote resources to enforcing national law than by allowing the
national government to so require, Justice Breyer pointed to the
allocation of power in the German federal union and the quasifederal European Union. 26 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
replied that reference to non-U.S. experience was perfectly
appropriate when the Framers were writing the Constitution, but
was inappropriate in interpreting the Constitution they wrote,z7

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

Jd. at 563-67.
Id. at 567-74.
Id. at 574-78.
Id. at 575.

Id.
Id. at 578.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
The fedeml systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union,
for example, all provide that constituent states, not fedeml bureaucracies,
will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees
enacted by the central 'federal' body. They do so in part because they
believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent
authority of the 'state,' member nation, or other subsidiary government,
and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.
ecitation omitted).
Id. at 921 n.11 (majority opinion).
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Knight v. Florida

Justice Breyer also referred to non-U.S. sources in his dissent
from the denial of certiorari in a case raising the question, is capital
punishment unconstitutional when the statutes authorizing the
penalty are administered in a manner that leads to extended stays
on death row, with attendant psychological and physical
consequences (the so-called "death row phenomenon")?S He
observed that constitutional courts for Jamaica (that is, the Privy
Council in Great Britain), India, Zimbabwe, and the European
Union had held that the death row phenomenon amounted to
inhumane treatment, while also noting that the Canadian Supreme
Court had taken the contrary position. 29 Although the non-U.S.
decisions did not "bind" the U.S. Supreme Court, he wrote, "this
Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way in
which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to
our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable
circumstances. ,,30
F.

Grutter v. Bollinger

Opening her concurring opmlOn in the case involving the
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law
School, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that a majority agreed
that its members expected that affirmative action programs would
be unnecessary-and would perhaps become unconstitutional-at
some point. 3l This, she wrote, "accords with the international
understanding of the office of affirmative action," citing a number
of international agreements. 32 She did not contend that the Court's
limitation on the temporal scope of affirmative action programs
was somehow compelled by international law, or even that the
agreements to which she referred gave the majority some reason to
adopt a temporal limitation. 33 And, notably-given that critics of
references to non-U.S. materials tend to be political conservatives
who believe that affirmative action programs should be more
broadly unconstitutional than the Court-the reference was in
support of a limitation on affirmative action. It may be worth
observing as well that Justice Ginsburg'S references to non-U.S.

28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
ld. at 995-96.
Id. at 997.
Grulter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The majority
stated that their expectation was that affirmative action programs would be
unnecessary in twenty-five years. !d. at 343 (majority opinion).
ld. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
ld. at 344-45.
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law here undennine the claims sometimes made that such
references are always in the service ofliberal positions?4
Having followed the controversy rather closely, I am confident
in asserting that the foregoing is a comprehensive list of the
controversial instances of recent Supreme Court references to nonU.S. law. 35 It is obviously a very short list. Some of the
references--clearly those in Atkins and Grutter, and less clearly in
Lawrence-are merely mentions of facts about the state of the law
outside the United States. The philosophers' distinction between
mention and use seems relevant here: These references mention
non-U.S. law, but do not use it in support of some proposition
about U.S. constitutional law. The difference can be seen in
Justice Scalia's criticism of the reference to opinions of the world
community in Atkins. 36 Contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion that
the majority used the facts about world-wide opinion "to fabricate
'national consensus,,,,37 the majority mentioned those facts as an
indication that the national consensus it found in domestic sources
was supported by professional organizations, religious
organizations, and national governments elsewhere. The Court's
evaluation of the national consensus revealed in domestic sources
showed U.S. legislatures were not out of tune with other groups.
This is true as well with the confinnatory references to non-U.S.
law in Roper. 38
Sometimes, of course, the references to non-U.S. law signal
genuine disagreement about constitutional interpretation. This is
clearly so in Printz. Justice Breyer thought that the interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution could be infonned by experience
elsewhere, which, he wrote, might "cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem ...
,,39 Justice Scalia's response was predicated on the view that
consequences were irrelevant, or at least not important enough, in
34.

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional
Comparativism, 52 UCLA 1. REV. 639, 702 (2005) (describing the possibility that
reliance on non-U .S. law would lead to the adoption of non-liberal results).
In Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002), in dissenting from a denial of
certiorari, Justice Breyer reiterated his concerns about the death row
phenomenon, again citing non-U.S. decisions. In Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045
(1995), in a memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens
observed that "the highest courts in other countries have found arguments
[regarding the death row phenomenon) persuasive." Justice Stevens also noted
an opinion by two English judges asserting that execution after long delay would
violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishments contained in the Bill of Rights
of 1689, which was, according to Justice Stevens, "the precursor of our own
Eighth Amendment." Id.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:
Convergence. Resistance.
Engagement, 119 HARV. 1. REv. 109, 115-16 n.30 (2005).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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determining what our Constitution means. 40 Here, though, the
controversy ought to be about the underlying theory of
constitutional interpretation, not about the references to non-U.S.
law, which are only one of many ways in which a Justice might
import consequences into the interpretive task.
Criticism of the more extensive references to non-U.S. law in
Roper seems to rest on the proposition that the Court did not mean
what it said. The thought appears to be that the references were
too extensive to be mere confirmation of a judgment already
reached. 41 More elaborately: Critics find the Court's assertions
about the existence of a trend in domestic law and practice
unpersuasive, and disagree with the proposition that precedent
authorized the Justices to make their own independent judgment
about questions of deterrence, retribution, and criminal
responsibility. So, the argument seems to be, the only thing that
could possibly have supported the majority's conclusion was nonU.S. law. On this view, the m~ority actually relied on, and did not
merely refer to, non-U.S. law. 2 The difficulty with this criticism
is that it is cogent only if the majority itself actually accepted the
criticisms of its own analysis, which is, to say the least, highly
unlikely.
I hope that this enumeration demonstrates how modest the
actual practice of referring to non-U.S. law is. The next section
examines whether the target of criticism is not the actual practice
but some practice that might develop out of it, and concludes that,
if so, the criticisms remain ill-founded.
II. FEAR OF THE FUTURE
Close reading of the critical literature on references to non-U.S.
law reveals that no one criticizes what the Justices have actually
done. Instead, the critics treat what the Justices have done as
foreshadowing more extensive uses of, and reliance on, non-U.S.
law in future cases. The actual practice, that is, appears to be
immune from criticism, but some extensions of that practice might
well be mistaken-and, the critics suggest, might be forthcoming
40.
41.

42.

Jd. at 921 n.11 (majority opinion).
See. e.g.. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 343-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court was fabricating a national consensus by relying on non-U.S. law, not
finding persuasive the Court's assertions about the trends in domestic law, and
concluding that the non-U.S. material must have played a larger role than the
majority's modest treatment of that material suggested).
Cf Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 90
(2005) (in discussing Roper, referring to "the psychological literature that it
misused, . . . [and] the national consensus that it concocted"); Young, supra
note IS, at 155 (referring to "the exceptionally weak evidence of domestic
consensus and the Court's close division on the objective morality component" in
Roper).
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unless the existing practice is beaten back.43 What the Justices
have done, on this view, is something like a baby in the crib, which
might grow into something threatening and should be strangled
right away.44
The first part of this criticism is obviously correct. Were a
Justice to say, "The ECHR has decided this precise question, and I
regard that decision as a binding precedent," the Justice would
have acted in a manner completely insupportable within the U.s.
constitutional tradition. 45 Even treating the ECHR decision as a
relevant precedent would be a jurisprudential mistake. Precedent
matters when there are reasons arising from the deciding court's
position in a judicial hierarchy, and independent of the merits of
the arguments the court provides, for adhering to the deciding
court's conclusion. But, again obviously, the ECHR-and indeed
nearly all non-U.S. adjudicatory bodies--does not stand in the
hierarchical relation to the U.S. courts that the concept relevant
.
46
precedent reqUIres.
So, the critics' concern has force only if there is some reason to
think that a practice, currently defensible, might tum into one that
is indefensible.47 This is essentially a standard slippery slope
argument, and as Professor Eugene Volokh has shown, such
arguments make sense only when we can describe some
mechanism that would lead someone to infer from a defensible
practice that it is permissible to engage in an otherwise
indefensible one. 48

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.

48.

See. e.g., Young, supra note 15, at 154 (describing what "at least in theory"
might be done with references to non·U.S. law).
To extend the metaphor, what the Justices have actually done is not a mature
practice.
Again, the obvious point is that the ECHR has jurisdiction over claims arising out
of a treaty to which the United States is not a party, and its interpretation of that
treaty cannot bind any U.S. actor, including the Supreme Court, as the U.S. actor
interprets the U.S. Constitution.
Nor, of course, have any of the references to non-U.S. law treated that law as
relevant precedent in the jurisprudential sense.
One version of the concern about what lies at the bottom of the slope is
"political." Conservatives fear that liberals will be able to refer to decisions from
high-prestige foreign courts, like the British House of Lords and the European
Court of Human Rights, while they will have to cite low-prestige ones, perhaps
the courts of China and the Sudan. If so, the shadow-effects of differential
prestige will hclp their opponents even if conservatives do start referring to nonU.S. law. It is not clear to me, though, that the predicate of this argument is
factually accurate. There are, I think, plenty of "conservative" decisions from
high-prestige foreign courts, including the German Constitutional Court and, on a
range of issues, the European Court of Human Rights. I thank Eric Posner for
suggesting that I address this question.
See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1026, 1030-32 (2003) (analyzing how to "sensibly evaluate the risk of
slippery slopes").
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Professor Volokh describes the structure of the slippery slope in
this way: You and I agree that some practice A (referring to nonU.S. law, for example) is defensible, but I believe that another
practice B (relying on non-U.S. law, for example) is indefensible
or undesirable. 49 You might now agree with me about that as well,
but I believe that if you engage in practice A by referring to nonU.S. law, you are more likely to end up thinking that practice B
(relying on non-U.S. law) is defensible or desirable. 5o So Twant to
stop you, and me, from engaging in referring to non-U.S. law.
Clearly, as Professor Volokh demonstrates, the key here is figuring
out why judges who defensibly refer to non-U.S. law are, as a
result of that practice, more likely to indefensibly rely on non-U.S.
law.
Professor Volokh identifies six mechanisms by which that
outcome can come about. 51 In the present context, only one seems
to me even plausible: Referring to non-U.S. law "may change
people's attitudes about the propriety of' relying on non-U.S.
law. 52 Professor Volokh observes, correctly, that this mechanism
"is connected to expressive theories of law."s3 That, in turn,
provides a general reason to be skeptical about arguments that we
will get on a slippery slope because the attitude-changing
mechanism will take hold: Expressive theories are quite dubious
as accounts oflaw and its social operation. 54
Even putting that general skepticism to one side, I find the
attitude-changing mechanism implausible in the context of
precedent rather than policy.55 The problem is that precedents
come inextricably packaged with reasons, explicitly offered rather

49.
50.

51.
52.

53.
54.

55.

See id. at 1028.
See id. at 1028, 1031-34 ("Slippery slopes may occur even when a principled
distinction can be drawn between decisions A and 8.").
ld. at 1033-34.
ld. at 1033 (emphasis omitted). The other mechanisms Professor Volokh
describes are: engaging in the new practice "may be seen as a small enough
change that people will reasonably ignore it" but, when taken together with other
similar changes might lead people to think that relying on non-U.S. law is
defensible; engaging in the new pmctice will create "political momentum" or
reduce the political power of opponents; doing so will lower the cost of the
undesirable practice; and doing so might trigger other rules that make the
undesirable practice easier to engage in. ld. at 1033-34.
ld. at 1036.
For" general critique of expressive theories of law, see Matthew Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363
(2000).
Notably, the standard example of attitude changing involves the adoption of antismoking policies, which are said to induce people to change their view of the
desirability of smoking cven in settings not covered by the policies. For
Professor Volokh's reference to this example, see Volokh, supra note 48, at
1036.
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than implicit in the very adoption of the practice. 56 So, in the
context of legal reasoning, the slippery slope must occur under the
following circumstances. A judge refers to non-U.S. law. The
judge offers good reasons for the reference, understands that those
reasons are not available to defend a practice of relying on nonU.S. law, and understands as well that there are other good reasons
that make relying on non-U.S. law indefensible. Time passes, and
the very fact that the judge referred to non-U.S. law leads the judge
or the judge's successors to forget the latter two understandings.
The attitude-changing mechanism works in this context because
of some uncertainty about what exactly hap~ens when a judge
refers to, but does not rely on, non-U.S. law. 5 Successor judges
mistakenly think that, notwithstanding what the original judges
said, what they did was rely on non-U.S. law. 58 I confess to
finding this account utterly implausible: The reasons are displayed
fully when the judge refers to non-US. law, and are fully available
when the successor judge relies on non-US. law. 59 If they are
rationally persuasive to the original judge, they should be
rationally persuasive to successor judges. 6o And, of course, the
case against relying on non-US. law collapses without reasons to
support it, so reaching the bottom of the slippery slope would not
be indefensible at all.
To summarize, opponents of the practice of referring to nonUS. law might be concerned that that practice, innocuous in itself,
portends the adoption of more threatening practices. I have argued
56.
57.

58.

59.

60.

See Volokh, supra note 48, at 1086-88 (discussing the importance of what people
perceive to be implicit in policy decisions).
See id. at 1065 (discussing situations in which "the justification underlying A is
vague enough that it could justify B, even if this effect isn't certain"); id. at 111214 (discussing vagueness of legal rules and its implications for slippery slope
mechanisms).
It may be worth noting that the persistent mischaracterizations in the critical
literature of what the Court has actually done might actually contribute to this
later-mistaken assessment. The successor judge might think, "Well, if all these
smart peoplc arc saying that the Supreme Court actually did rely on non-U.S.
law, who am I to go against that consensus?" The critical literature might in that
way help bring about the outcome it seeks to prevent occurring.
Professor Volokh refers to problems of public perceptions about what courts have
done in these terms: "[P]eople might still interpret a decision as endorsing a
certain justification even if that's not quite what the decision held, partly because
many people don't read court decisions very closely or remember them precisely
(again because of rational ignorance)." [d. at 1090. This point seems clearly
inapplicable---or, if applicable, extremely weak-in the case of Supreme Court
Justices.
1 do not want to press the following point too hard, but I suspect that what drives
my skepticism is the view that reasons operate differently from attitudes.
Professor Volokh's discussion is premised, in part, on the assumption that
successor judges (to use my term) in fact do not find the reasons rationally
persuasive. See id. at 1069, 1097 (discussing an example that works because the
successor judges had principles different from those of the original judges).
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that there seems to be no reason to believe that to be so: If judges
in the future start relying on non-U.S. law, they will do so not
because they found it easier to defend doing so given that Justices
before them referred to non-U.S. law, but because they think there
are good reasons for doing so. Arguing about the practice of
referring to non-U.S. law makes no headway with respect to the asyet-unadopted practice of relying on non-U.S. law.
III. CONCLUSION: THE CULTURE WARS IN THE
SUPREME COURT
Justice Scalia infamously described one of the Court's decisions
as an inappropriate intervention in the contemporary culture
wars.61 The political valence of the controversy of references to
non-U.S. law strongly suggests that that controversy too is part of
the culture wars.62 The final question I wish briefly to address here
is: Why did such a minor practice become one front in the culture
wars? I divide this in two parts: How does the dispute fit into the
culture wars, and why did it come to matter as part of the culture
wars?63
I doubt that there can be a neutral or objective description of the
issues in the culture wars, in large part because the combatants
disagree over how their disagreements should be characterized and
over whether anything could count as a neutral description. With
that caution, I here identify two components of the culture wars,
one limited to the culture wars in the courts, the other applicable
more broadly.
Within the courts, the culture wars take the form of disputes
about constitutional interpretation. Some conservatives believe
that the sources of constitutional interpretation must be carefully
limited, while others believe that constitutional interpretation is
properly an eclectic matter in which all manner of sources can be
used. 64 The former believed-in my view, mistakenly-that they
had made great headway in disciplining constitutional
interpretation, and see, in references to non-U.S. law,
disconfirmation of that belief. They characterize references as
61.
62.

63.
64.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court
has mistaken a Kulturkampffor a fit of spite.").
I think it worth observing that refusing to refer to non-U.S. law, at least once the
possibility has been raised, is as much an intervention in the culture wars as doing
so.
The premise of this second sub-question is that almost anything can become a
front in the culture wars, but only some things do.
For a discussion of eclecticism in U.S. constitutional interpretation, see Mark
Tushnct, The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed.
2006).

310

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

reliance to reduce the ensuing cognitive dissonance. We can see
this phenomenon, I think, in the standard argument that their
opponents actually recognize that they have lost the domestic
battle over constitutional interpretation, and so, have turned to nonU.S. law to make foreigners' views override Americans,.65
The larger issue in the culture wars, I suggest, is a dispute over
66
what it means to be an American patriot. For one side, American
patriotism consists in the celebration of the unique contributions
the United States has made to the world's prosperity, institutions,
and ideals. 67 Among those contributions, of course, is the U.S.
Constitution. For the other side, American patriotism consists in
celebrating the nation's diversity, its cosmopolitan appreciation of
what the world's peoples have contributed to the United States,
and of course, the nation's contributions to the world's prosperity,
institutions, and ideals. For the first side, making modest reference
to non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation implicitly
deprecates the nation's uniqueness. The practice is a form of the
cosmopolitanism that it finds inconsistent with its version of
American patriotism.
And, the practice suggests that the
Constitution could be improved from the outside. 68
Another theme in the culture wars is an asserted disagreement
between those who believe that human experience reflects and
65.

66.

67.

68.

For one articulation of this argument, see Young, supra note 15, at 163
("Opponents of the death penalty who have striven in vain to persuade their
fellow Americans to abandon the measure will find more support by extending
their sphere of argument to take in foreign opinions and practices. "). I think it
significant that Professor Young uses a case about the juvenile death penalty,
where the Court did after all find a domestic trend against the practice, to
illustrate an argument about public support for the death penalty generically.
Compare LARRY SCHWEIKART & MICHAEL PATRICK ALLEN, A PATRIOT'S
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM COLUMBUS'S GREAT DISCOVERY TO THE
WAR ON TERROR (2004) (offering a right-wing perspective), with HOWARD ZINN,
A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT (Harper Perennial
2003) (1980) (offering a left-wing perspective). I cite these works because of
what the difference in their titles suggests.
I note as well that in some versions, this vision of patriotism has a xenophobic
tinge. That is typically not associated with sophisticated conservatives, who are
sometimes a bit embarrassed about what their allies say. The result, as Eric
Posner has suggested to me, is that, in his terms, conservative "elites can
shamefacedly depict the left as unpatriotic, while the left can argue that the right
is pandering" to its xenophobic allies. E-mail from Eric Posner, Kirkland and
Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago, to Mark Tushnet, Carmack
Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center
(Nov. 30, 2005) (on file with author).
For some, this position may be supplemented or supported by the view that the
Constitution is one example of God's intervention in history on behalf of the
United States. See Alice M. Batchelder, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, Seventh Annual Robert E. Henderson Constitution Day Lecture:
The Judiciary: Having "neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment"? (Sept. 16,
2005)
(audio
recording
available
at
hltp:llwww.ashbrook.orglevents/constitutionlbatchelder.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2006».
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seeks to realize universal values, and those who are said to take a
more relativistic view. That theme comes out in the present
context when critics of references to non-U.S. law emphasize that
legal doctrines are so embedded in a nation's array of culture,
institutions, and values that one nation's experience is rarely
relevant to another's problems, to be countered by assertions that
thoughtful judges around the world are all trying to come up with
appropriate solutions to problems that are roughly similar. 69 What
is notable here, and what indicates that we are dealing with a
culture-wars issue, is that in this context those who usually defend
the idea that there are universal values take the relativists' position.
There may well be other dimensions of the culture wars
implicated in this controversy. For example, the "values are
relative" argument against referring to non-U.S. law may rest, not
on a rejection of universalism, but a suspicion that the values being
invoked-sometimes at the urging of transnational human rights
non-governmental organizations-are not truly universal values
and might indeed be driven in part by anti-Americanism. Some,
but not all, of those opposed to the practice of referring to non-U.S.
law are also opposed to high levels of immigration, legal and
illegal, into the United States, suggesting that for these opponents
there might be a substratum of xenophobia to their opposition.
But, because I am a legal scholar and not a cultural analyst, I am
uncomfortable speculating further about how the controversy
considered here fits into the culture wars.
I tum, then, to my second sub-question: Why did this practice
become one front in the culture wars? The answer, I think, is that
the practice was associated with, though not causally connected to,
a set of decisions themselves part of the culture wars: death
penalty eases, gay rights cases, and an affirmative action case. I
am aware that the answer I suggested to the first sub-question
placed the onus on the conservative side in the culture wars, but in
partial compensation, perhaps, here my suggested answer puts the
onus on the liberal side. That is, precisely because the references
to non-U.S. law are so modest, one can ask Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer why they bothered to insert them, except to
irritate those on the other side in the culture wars, or perhaps to put
their opponents in the awkward position of defending the value of
knowing less rather than knowing more.
Can anything be done to damp down the controversy, which
seems rationally indefensible? The problem with the culture wars
is that once the genie is out of the bottle, it is hard to put it back
69.

For a discussion of these arguments, see Mark Tushnct, When Is Knowing Less
Beller Than Knowing More?: Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court
Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006).
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in. 7o That is, once something becomes a front in the culture wars,
the only way to end the confrontation is for one side to withdraw,
that is, to accept a loss. That would clearly be true were
proponents of references to non-U.S. law to stop making such
references. Perhaps though, opponents of the practice might recast
their opposition in a way that opens up some common ground. If,
as I have suggested, their real concerns are with potential
extensions of the practice, and not with what has already happened,
they might make that concern clear, allowing those who engage in
the practice to make clear, in return, that they have no intention to
extend the practice and indeed would themselves find troubling the
extensions that trouble their opponents. 71 They might start to
develop criteria explaining their selection of jurisdictions to which
reference can properly be made, for example. 72 But, culture wars
being what they are, I would not count on this outcome.

70.

71.

72.

That is, one's position on this question is a signal of where one stands on other
issues. So, even if on reflection a liberal thought it unimportant that the courts
refer to non-U.S. law, such a liberal would nonetheless refrain from criticizing
the practice because to do so would be to betray the cause (and similarly for
conservatives). Again, Eric Posner's comments suggested this elaboration. See
supra note 67.
In this light, Justice Scalia's comment in Atkins may have been particularly
unfortunate in converting a practice that might have attracted no attention into a
front in the culture wars. See supra note 7.
See Tushnet, supra note 69, where I sketch some possibilities along these lines.

